○  英语演讲稿：the great silent majority  ○

negotiate an agreement. they would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.

the other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the south vietnamese forces.

and i’m glad to be able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in june for withdrawal.

as a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in june.

now this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable.  we must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time, rather than on estimates that are no longer valid.

along with this optimistic estimate, i must in all candor leave one note of caution.  if the level of enemy activity significantly increases, we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly.  however, i want the record to be completely clear on one point.

at the time of the bombing halt just a year ago there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of north vietnam, they would stop the shelling of cities in south vietnam.

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